Published by the San Diego Rifle and Revolver Association
Contributor Commentaries
Stop the Silliness: Arm Our Soldiers and Marines
Sunday, 08 November 2009 07:24 | Author: Ralph Weller |
In my last article I described what it’s like on Fort Hood, as well as all U.S. Army installations. It’s like Chicago. The only people armed are the post law enforcement agency such as Military Police or the Federal Police and those intent on criminal activity. Soldiers are not armed with loaded firearms ever, except during periodic weapons qualification. Private ownership of firearms is generally ok providing the firearm is locked up in a designated armory on post/base. The soldier does not have immediate access to their private firearms. Having a firearm in the sleeping quarters or military housing is against regulations and is subject to a court martial.
The bottom line solution is simple, arm officers and non-commissioned officers with side arms. When on duty, no matter the location, whether on post/base or off, commissioned and non-commissioned officers should be required carry a loaded pistol, either openly or concealed. When off-duty they should be allowed to secure their weapons within their quarters. It becomes a part of their uniform.
Soldiers who are not commissioned or non-commissioned officers, while on-duty and while on post/base property should be issued their M16 rifles with a full magazine compliment. The weapon and ammo should be turned in to the main armory when coming off-duty unless provisions to secure the weapons within each bay or room are provided.
If a soldier misuses a weapon for any reason, it’s grounds for a court martial with severe punishment to follow. Being a soldier or marine comes with responsibilities not unlike a law enforcement officer. There is no room for irresponsibility so the punishment for misuse of a weapon should be clearly defined, taught to the soldiers and enforced with vigor when abused.
The military’s job is to defend this nation first. Expeditionary forces are secondary to its mission. If our military cannot be armed while on duty within the borders of the U.S., it can hardly fulfill its primary mission of providing for the defense of the nation, let alone allow for maximum security of the installation and personal defense of soldiers and marines.
It is time to end this political correct nonsense of maintaining an unarmed military force.
Paul Helmke, Dumb As A Doorknob Award
Saturday, 07 November 2009 10:47 | Author: Ralph Weller |
This is the latest statement from Paul Helmke of the Brady Campaign on the tragic Fort Hood shooting. He wins my “Dumb-As-A-Doorknob of the Year” award.
Helmke’s statement:
“This latest tragedy, at a heavily fortified army base, ought to convince more Americans to reject the argument that the solution to gun violence is to arm more people with more guns in more places.”
Having spent a combined 20 years of active and reserve service in the Army, I got to see what a “heavily fortified army base” is. I spent a couple of years at Fort Hood, the largest military installation in the free world and a few other installations, both Army and Marine bases, so I know a little bit more than Helmke does on this subject.
Fort Hood is hardly a “heavily fortified army base.” It’s like a small city of 50,000 people. It’s a typical army base with typical soldiers and their families. Military police function as local law enforcement officers for the base and provide services like most any small city, so they are armed. There may be federal law enforcement present, primarily civilians with either military or civilian law enforcement backgrounds that function as most any civilian police department in your home town. They are there to augment the military police, of which most are overseas in Iraq or Afghanistan. They are also armed like any civilian law enforcement officer.
But, that’s where the similarities end between your hometown and Fort Hood. When it comes to firearms ownership, Fort Hood, as do all Army installations in the U.S. resembles Chicago.
The Army practices a very strict form of gun control. Despite their military duties, training, and illusion that a place like Fort Hood is full of 45,000 armed troops, that is not the case. You can own a private firearm, but it must be stored in a designated armory where it is kept under lock and key, and in some instances under 24 hour guard. Firearms cannot be kept in barracks or military housing. If a soldier is caught with a firearm, it’s immediate grounds for a court martial.
Military firearms such as the M4 or M16 are kept locked up in the unit armory. Firearms are issued to soldiers for field exercises, at which point they may be given a blank adapter and blanks to simulate real ammunition being fired. The only time a soldier is in possession of a loaded military firearm is at a range for weapons qualification. It is very closely supervised, brass is collected and personnel are required to relinquish any unfired ammunition. When qualification is complete, the firearms used are returned and accounted for at the unit armory.
A personal experience with my own M16 points out how gun control works in the military. I was in a two-week field exercise at Fort Hood, an annual event that involved the majority of military personnel on the base. Fort Hood, at well over 200,000 acres can handle two complete combat divisions, approximately 30-40,000 personnel in the field at one time. The day before the end of the two week field exercise I was recalled back to my unit for some duties that needed to be fulfilled. A jeep (yes, I’m that old) hauled me, my gear and my M16 back to the unit. It had been a soggy two weeks with rain that was almost continuous. I wasn’t complaining. I was glad to get back to civilization at that point, even if was only one day early.
At some point later in the day, with my M16 at my side the entire time, I realized I needed to turn it into the armory. The armory for my unit was about one mile away. Now, instinctively I knew walking a mile alone on base with an M16 slung on my shoulder was not the brightest thing to do. It would draw the attention of the military police on base if not every officer and non-commissioned officer that passed me by. The result would be a very bad outcome. You see, I was essentially carrying a military weapon with no security for the weapon, other than me. I asked for someone to transport me to the armory in a military vehicle. None were available. They were all in the field. I was told to go on over there anyway and turn my weapon in by the Sergeant on duty. I wasn’t about to walk, so I dumped my M16 into the front seat of my car and headed on over. As I pulled into the parking lot, got out of my vehicle and pulled my M16 out, a relatively low ranking officer approached and bellowed, “What in the hell are you doing with an M16 in your car soldier?” I explained the situation and he came to the conclusion that I probably did the right thing and let me go to turn in the weapon. Needless-to-say, I heard from the sergeant the next day who sent me over to turn in my weapon. He got his butt chewed out. Despite being in the military, carrying an M16 around or throwing it my car is not the recommended method to control weapons in the Army.
For gun control advocates, gun crimes do occur on military installations. A fellow that I went through basic training with a few years earlier was sent from Germany to my unit pending a court martial that was to be held at Fort Hood. He was a witness to a crime in Germany by other soldiers. Apparently, the crime involved several military personnel engaged in a black market scheme of selling stolen military equipment to civilians in Europe. The civilians were most likely not your basic civilians but spies from other countries, most notably the Soviet Union.
Within two weeks of his arrival he was dead, shot in the head in the barracks one night as he slept. It was a hit to keep him from testifying. Organized crime and criminal activities are not the exclusive right of the civilian world. And, despite very strict gun control on base, if a criminal needs to use a gun, they can get one and they will use it. Everyone is armed who wants to be, and those who follow the rules are not. It’s no different than Chicago.
For all practical purposes on a U.S. Army installation, soldiers on any given day are completely unarmed and defenseless. That’s hardly a model of a “heavily fortified army base.” If anything, it’s a model of gun control that leaves our military personnel vulnerable to attack, either internally by nut cases like Hasan, or externally by terrorists hell bent on killing as many people as possible.
Oddly, just outside the gate is the town of Killeen. Civilians are allowed to carry concealed firearms, own firearms and use them for self-defense. But that all ends the moment you enter the gate of Fort Hood.
There is talk that the military may review its gun policies. If it’s anything less than allowing soldiers to defend themselves and their families, don’t bother with it. Don’t insult members of the military by banning privately owned guns that are already under lock and key and held by the military.
Gun control in the military has played an ugly role in making otherwise brave men and women nothing but victims. If the military can trust their men and women in combat, they should trust them 24 hours a day on any military base, over there or here.
Lastly, it only goes to show when the populace is disarmed, the only good that comes from it is tragedy. It’s simply too easy for people like Hasan to shoot with impunity at an unarmed group of military personnel. The ability to defend one’s life is paramount to our existence as human beings. It is ingrained in our DNA. It is instinctive for us as humans to protect our own lives. Yet, our brave soldiers in the U.S. Army are treated as something less than human when it comes to defending their own lives. That needs to change in order to keep nut cases like Hasan in check. Military personnel have the right to self-defense not unlike civilians. It’s insanity to disarm our military while civilians, some with no military training and living adjacent to a military base, are allowed the basic right of self-defense. Does that make sense to anyone? It didn’t make sense when I was in the Army, and considering the world situation, it makes less sense today.
No one stopped Hasan early in his attack because no one other than military law enforcement was armed on Fort Hood. That’s not the way to run an army.
Ft Hood Shooter. It Was All About Him.
Saturday, 07 November 2009 08:18 | Author: Ralph Weller |
The Fort Hood shooting by Major Hasan is profoundly shocking on many levels.
Hasan, who I will refer to by his last name only beyond this point, because he does not deserve the honor of being called by his rank, killed 13 fellow soldiers on November 5. The fact that it was Fort Hood, a place I spent some time at is one thing. Having been enlisted myself, and a non-commissioned officer, it is even more shocking that the shooter was a major. Officers of his rank are viewed as leaders, not killers of fellow soldiers.
In my years of active duty and active reserve in the Army, the last person you would expect to “snap” would be a senior officer. However, having heard enough about Hasan, it doesn’t surprise me.
Here’s a fellow that was basically handed a medical career by the Army. Folks like Hasan gain rank quickly and sometimes never assimilate properly as military officers.
Anyone who has spent time in the service just assumes that someone of Hasan’s rank, a major, probably has had some command time, went through significant leadership training and all that good stuff that military officers go through. Unfortunately, that may indeed not have been the case for Hasan. He was in a highly specialized field, where those around him have roughly the same rank, skill sets, and zero leadership skills training.
My take on Hasan was that he acted more like a disgruntled private that had been drafted into the Army. For those not old enough to remember, it was not uncommon to encounter herds of draftees with bad attitudes during the Vietnam War. They didn’t want to be in the army and couldn’t wait to get out. A lot of draftees served with honor and distinction, and a lot of them died in action, and they deserve to be honored with respect. But, the Army was also infected with a percentage of troops that were nothing but trouble. They had a profoundly negative effect on the army as a whole by the time the Vietnam War ended some 35 years ago. Hasan sounds like one of these people. This is a guy that has a good job in the military, a non-combat position, an education provided by the military and a career that some could only dream about compliments of the U.S. taxpayer. Yet, when it was time to serve in a non-combat position in the Middle East, he balked. There were a lot of things we didn’t like to do in the military. But shirking responsibilities is not something a commissioned officer does. Hasan has all the earmarks of a self-absorbed soldier. It was all about him, not the Army, not his fellow soldiers, not his duty as an officer, or his duty to the country.
Whether he was like that because he never assimilated into the Army system and was never provided the opportunity to be in a leadership position that distinguishes Army officers from enlisted or non-commissioned officers, or whether he had elevated his religious beliefs above that of his career and lives of fellow soldiers, is difficult to discern. Maybe it was a little of both. But, one thing is for certain. Whatever was going through Hasan’s head, it was not to ‘take care of his soldiers,’ which every Army officer who has been in a leadership position understands is a primary duty. Hasan was not of this mind-set, which I believe the Army needs to take a very hard look at. It’s one thing to train personnel in highly specialized fields, but to give them the rank and privileges of officers who command units consisting of hundreds of men in combat, has always been a sore spot with commissioned and non-commissioned officers alike.
Everyone knows that the highly specialized officer of the rank of captain (O-3) or major (O-4) earned his or her rank based on their technical merits, not their leadership skills. But, to the average enlisted man or woman or non-commissioned officer, they are an officer first, just as much as the hardened combat infantry officer.
No doubt this incident has placed some doubt in the minds of enlisted personnel. That’s not a good thing. Leadership is a fragile skill that can be lost in very short order in the military. The Army takes great pain to hone leadership skills of its officers. It is important that men in combat trust commissioned officers. It is important officers have the trust of their men. It’s a two-way street. It’s how the Army works. Hasan, with his rank and his dispicable act, broke that trust.
But, the story doesn’t end here. It gets even more insidious as information slowly comes out about those who lost their lives in this senseless tragedy.
It was announced last evening on November 6, one day after the tragedy, that one of the 13 killed was an army reservist from San Diego.
Major John Gaffaney, U.S. Army Reserves, left for Fort Hood on November 1. Major Gaffaney was a psychiatric counselor assigned to the 1908th Medical Detachment, a unit that specializes in combat stress counseling, with its headquarters based in the Midwest. Major Gaffaney, 56 years of age, had joined the Army Reserves in 2006 after retiring in 1999 from the National Guard. By all accounts, Major Gaffaney was a true citizen soldier, after originally spending his first enlistment on active duty in the U.S. Navy and eventually obtaining civilian credentials in psychiatric care, joined the Army National Guard in 1985. He obtained his commission after attending Army Officers Candidate School. He is the true definition of a citizen soldier. You can read about Major Gaffaney in the North County Times.
Major Gaffaney was not the only mental health officer killed at Fort Hood this week. It seems other members of the 1908th Combat Stress Detachment were processing through the building in preparation for deployment to the Middle East. Other experts in the field of mental health were present and a number of them were killed or wounded. Initial reports suggest as many as 5 or 6 of those killed were from the same command as Major Gaffaney.
It has been reported that Hasan had been notified of his pending deployment to Afghanistan or Iraq. Hasan spent time at Walter Reed Army Hospital as a psychiatrist and recently transferred to Fort Hood. According to various reports he did not want to go to the Middle East. It seems more than coincidental that Hasan was present in the building, the very day members of the 1908th were processing for deployment. Could it be that Hasan had been assigned to the 1908th to augment their deployment? It is not uncommon for highly specialized units like the 1908th to receive additional headcount from the active duty ranks prior to deployment to fill out vacant positions and bring the unit to full strength. If that is so, this makes the tragedy of this event even more compelling. If Hasan timed his killings to intentionally kill reserve members of the 1908th that he himself had been assigned to, and maybe ordered to deploy with, it takes this story to a new level.
Highly skilled units like the 1908th are few and far between. Based on my research, there appear to be only two combat stress units in the Army Reserve, making this type of capability rare to draw from. Could Hasan have timed his killings with the intent of specifically inflicting the most damage he could to the this unit's mission of providing mental health services to personnel in the Middle East?
We may never know answers to these questions, but I fear there is more to this than we have heard, and that Hasan’s appearance at the deployment facility at that date and time is more than coincidence. He may have indeed planned to take out his fellow psychiatric medical officers.
I hope Hasan recovers from his wounds and lives. I hope he is incarcerated in a military prison for the rest of his life. He will have to be isolated from the general population for obvious reasons, which means he will lead a lonely life in which he can fear for his own every single day. Military prisoners may not be the most savory bunch of people, but there is a code, even among military prisoners, that what he did was unforgiveable. If they ever get their hands on him it is not a matter of if he will live, it will be for how long.
May God be with Major Gaffaney and his family and the officers and enlisted who died so tragically at Fort Hood. They were only doing their job.
Hasan v Cook – A Contrast in Political Correctness
Friday, 06 November 2009 16:21 | Author: William M Lolli |
Was Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the killer of FortHood’s 13 people at last count, a victim? The major media outlets would have us think so.
It seems that the only thing Major Hasan really wanted was to get out of the racist, religiously bigoted Army. And when he couldn’t, he had no choice but to do the right thing and gun down as many of those bad Army people as he could while proclaiming how great God is [“Allahu Akbar”].
Contrast the press handling of Major Hasan with that of Army Major Stefan Cook, whose only crime was he was a “Birther”.
Yes, that’s right—one of those evil Obamabirth-certificate people who willing to serve our nation in combat, desirous of continuing a military career, not wanting out of overseas duty nor an end to their service; but whose only offense is that they dared to ask for clarification of the Commander in Chief’s Constitutional Article 2 Section 1 status.
As a result of his lawful questioning of authority, Cook was granted conscientious objector status, had his orders revoked (not of his choosing – the Army’s decision) and was fired from his defense department civilian contractor job. Major Cook still wants to deploy to Afghanistan – just not under potentially unlawful circumstances.
If Major Hasan wanted out of the military because he feared the awful pressure of his religious convictions in fighting the Bush-Obama War, all he would have had to do is go to his commanding officer and ask:
“Where’s the Birth Certificate?”
I can practically guarantee you that Hasan would have been granted a discharge the next day.
But then, he would not be the misunderstood “victim” of the press that he is today.
Don’t believe that Hasan is a victim? How about these quotes from news outlets:
“FortHood shooting suspect, Major Nidal Malik Hasan, wanted out of the Army after being constantly harassed by others in the military and was called a ‘camel jockey,’ his family said.
“As Hasan was about to be deployed to Iraq, he was suffering from some of the same stresses that he was trained as an Army psychiatrist to treat.
“Although the 39-year-old had just been promoted to major in May, his family says he had hired a lawyer to help him get out of the Armed Forces.
“Hasan is an American citizen of Palestinian descent and after the 9/11 attacks, his cousin says he was the target of constant harassment from others in the military. His tormentors called him a "camel jockey," said his cousin, Nader Hasan. He wanted out of the Army, so he paid back his military student loans and hired an attorney.”
“While the bullying irritated Hasan, Nader Hasan believes his upcoming deployment is what set him off”
And what a great guy. What sterling credentials.
Major Nidal Malik Hasan:
39 years old. Born in Arlington, raised primarily in southwestern Virginia, graduated from WilliamFlemingHigh School in Roanoke . Also attended Arlington's WakefieldHigh School for a year. U.S. Army psychiatrist. Graduated from Virginia Tech with honors in 1995. Studied at BarstowCommunity College in California and VirginiaWesternCommunity College in Roanoke. Received doctorate in psychiatry from the UniformedServicesUniversity of the Health Sciences in Bethesda. Resident and then a fellow at WalterReedArmyMedicalCenter in the District. Commissioned as a Captain, he was promoted to Major in May. Was awaiting deployment to Afghanistan, which was to be his first Army service overseas. He is listed by the Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress as a fellow for disaster and preventive psychology. As of Oct. 13, he had less than a year of clinical practice. He attended the MuslimCommunity Center in Silver Spring and is devout, according to Faizul Khan, former imam at the center. He attended prayers at least once a day, seven days a week, often in his Army fatigues, Khan said.
SOURCES: Army records and officials, Virginia Tech officials, Arlington schools officials, Washington Post staff writers
See? Hasan was a great guy that just got pushed too far.
And what about that evil Stefan Cook character?
Here is what the lib-press and blogosphere says:
“Army Reserve Major Stefan Frederick Cook Successfully Weasels His Way Out Of Afghanistan Combat Orders By Challenging President Barack Hussein Obama’s Eligibility As His Commander-In-Chief”
“Cook is anything more than a common coward who is frightened about going to a war zone one way and coming back a bit “altered” like so many of us have before him.”
“Huffpost - Stefan Frederick Cook: Soldier Won't Deploy Over Obama Birth Certificate”
“[Cook’s position is..] Boilerplate nutjobbery, sure. This man should be brought before a court martial, stripped of his rank, and dismissed from the service. Plain and simple”
“[Re]'Tard of the Week - Major Stefan Frederick Cook, USA”
Gee—I am almost convinced.
But wait! Let’s look at Major Cook’s record compared to the Religion of Peace Hasan:
Stefan Cook’s Decorations, Service Medals, and Badges:
Combat Patch Defense Meritorious Service Medal Joint Meritorious Unit Award with one Oak Leaf Cluster Joint Service Achievement Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster Army Achievement Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star device Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal Global War on Terrorism Service Medal Army Service Ribbon Armed Forces Reserve Medal with M device Reserve Component Overseas Training Ribbon
Educational Degrees: St. John’s University, Jamaica, New York, BS Economics 1983 Fordham University, New York, New York MBA Finance/Quantitative Analysis 1988 AnnaMariaCollege, Falmouth, Mass., MS Quality Management 1996
Military Schools Attended:Year Completed
NJ Military Academy, Officer’s CandidateSchool 1990 EngineerSchool, Engineer Officer Basic Course (Resident) 1991 DefenseMappingSchool, Mapping Charting & Geodesy Officer Course (Resident) 1991 EngineerSchool, Engineer Construction Course (Correspondence) 1992 EngineerSchool, Engineer Combat Support Course (Correspondence) 1993 NJ MilitaryAcademy, Instructor Trainer Course (Resident) 1993 PhysicalFitnessSchool, Master Fitness Trainer Course (Resident) 1994 MI School, Military Intelligence Officer Transition Course (Ph I Correspondence) 1995 EngineerSchool, Engineer Officer Advance Course (Ph I Correspondence) 1995 EngineerSchool, Engineer Officer Advance Course (Ph II Resident) 1996 C&GSC, Combined ArmsServicesStaffSchool (Ph I Correspondence) 1998 C&GSC, Combined ArmsServicesStaffSchool (Ph II a Resident) 2000 C&GSC, Combined ArmsServicesStaffSchool (Ph II b Resident) 2000 NJ Military Academy, Officer’s CandidateSchool 1990 EngineerSchool, Engineer Officer Basic Course (Resident) 1991 DefenseMappingSchool, Mapping Charting & Geodesy Officer Course (Resident) 1991 EngineerSchool, Engineer Construction Course (Correspondence) 1992 EngineerSchool, Engineer Combat Support Course (Correspondence) 1993 NJ MilitaryAcademy, Instructor Trainer Course (Resident) 1993 PhysicalFitnessSchool, Master Fitness Trainer Course (Resident) 1994 MI School, Military Intelligence Officer Transition Course (Ph I Correspondence) 1995 EngineerSchool, Engineer Officer Advance Course (Ph I Correspondence) 1995 EngineerSchool, Engineer Officer Advance Course (Ph II Resident) 1996 C&GSC, Combined ArmsServicesStaffSchool (Ph I Correspondence) 1998 C&GSC, Combined ArmsServicesStaffSchool (Ph II a Resident) 2000 C&GSC, Combined ArmsServicesStaffSchool (Ph II b Resident) 2000 TransportationSchool, Transportation Officer Advanced Course (Ph I Correspondence) 2001 TransportationSchool, Senior Transportation Officer Qualification Course Marine Terminal Track (Web Based Course) 2002 USARC Risk Management Train the Trainer Course (Resident) 2002 Signal School, Signal Officer Advanced Course (Ph I Correspondence) 2003 C&GSC, Command and General Staff officer Course (Ph I Correspondence) 2004 C&GSC, Command and General Staff officer Course (Ph II Correspondence) 2004 C&GSC, Command and General Staff officer Course (Ph III Correspondence) 2004 C&GSC, Command and General Staff officer Course (Ph IV Correspondence) 2004 JointForcesStaffCollege, Advanced Joint Professional Military Education 2005 EngineerSchool, Joint Engineer Officer Course 2006 Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Level I course (Web-based) 2008 Improved Explosive Device Awareness Course (Web-based) 2009 Civil Military Relations in an Interagency Context (Web-based) 2009 Defense Against Suicide Bombing Course (Web-based) 2009 Pre-Deployment Cultural Awareness – Afghanistan Course (Web-based) 2009
Chronological Record of Duty Assignments:FromTo
Active Duty – USAF Cadet, USAirForceAcademy Jun 78 Jul 79 Company Clerk, Co B., 104th EN BN Sep 88 Mar 89 Officer Candidate, NJ MilitaryAcademy Mar 89 Jun 90 Platoon Leader, Co E, 104th EN BN Jun 90 Jan 91 Student, EngineerSchool, FortLeonard Wood Jan 91 May 91 Platoon Leader, Co E, 104th EN BN May 91 Aug 91 Student, DefenseMappingSchool, Ft.Belvoir Aug 91 Nov 91 Platoon Leader, Co E, 104th EN BN Nov 91 Dec 91 Platoon Leader, 554th EN BN, Honduras Jan 92 Mar 92 Platoon Leader, Co E, 104th EN BN Mar 92 Jun 92 Asst. S3, HHC 104th EN BN Jun 92 Apr 94 Student, USArmyPhysicalFitnessSchool, Ft. Benning, GA Apr 94 May 94 Asst. S3, HHC 104th EN BN May94 Nov 94 Individual Ready Reserve, (Control Group) Army Reserve PersonnelCenter, St. Louis, MO Nov 94 Dec 94 Engineer Staff Officer, HQ, State Area Command Jan 95 Nov 96 Student, EngineerSchool, Fort Leonard Wood, MO Nov 96 Dec 96 Engineer Staff Officer, HQ, State Area Command Jan 96 Jan 98 Engineer Staff Officer, HQ, State Area Command Jan 98 Jun 00 Student, C&GSC, Combined Arms and ServicesStaffSchool MacDill Air Force Base, FL Jul 00 Aug 00 Engineer Staff Officer, HQ, State Area Command Aug 00 Oct 00 Air Movements Officer, HQ, 32nd TRANSGROUP, Tampa, FL Oct 00 Aug 01 S3 Plans Officer, HQ, 32nd TRANSGROUP, Tampa, FL Aug 01 Feb 02 S3 Plans Officer, HQ, 32nd TRANSGROUP, Camp Doha, Kuwait Direct support to 143d TRANSCOM (FWD) Feb 02 Feb 03 Individual Ready Reserve, (Reinforcement) Army Reserve PersonnelCenter, St. Louis, MO Feb 03 Oct 03 Individual Mobilization Augmentee, Army Reserve, assigned HQ USSOUTHCOM SCEN as Regional Contingency Engineer Management Cell Liaison Officer for South America Team Oct 03 Jul 05 HQ USSOUTHCOM, Standing Joint Force Headquarters Miami, FL, Engineer Planner Aug 05 Jan 06 HQ USSOUTHCOM, SCEN Miami, FL Engineer Planner/Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Engineer SME Jan 06 Jul 07 Individual Mobilization Augmentee, Army Reserve, assigned HQ USSOUTHCOM SCEN as Regional Contingency Engineer Management Cell Central American Team Chief Jul 07 Present
Gee. I don’t get it.
Why would a decorated warrior like Major Cook be branded by the media as a coward, kook, and nut job when it is plain that he took a significant risk, ultimately jeopardizing and losing his sterling military career, simply to get the answer to the question “Is the current holder of the president of the United States lawfully eligible?”
Likewise, why would the media gush with confused astonishment and hand-wringing cries of compassion over a mass murderer?
I doubt the US Armed Forces would tolerate a practicing Nazi. Why did the command structure of the Army sustain and promote one such as Major Hasan?
The answer is simple. Shockingly simple:
Cultural-political correctness has infiltrated our Armed Forces so completely that it has now bred an explosive, deadly Jihadist-enemy culture within the very forces created for our protection.
And in the same morally twisted way, Major Cook was an enemy of the state and a threat to the cohesion of military authority, simply because he wanted proof that Barack Obama was Constitutionally eligible.
Somehow, “where’s the birth certificate?” is more of a threat to the United States than killing 10's of innocent Americans.
This is how bad things have become in America: Those who hold the Constitution as sacred are condemned, mocked, and destroyed, while those who murder in the name of Jihad have to be “understood” and cherished as “victims”.
Where has your moral clarity gone, America?
Kerchner v Obama on its way to Appeal
Saturday, 24 October 2009 18:46 | Author: Mario Apuzzo |
Editors Note: William Lolli here. Although a contributing editor for GND, I am also a “certifiable Birther”. It is probably debatable that there is a link between the Barack Obama Birth Certificate issue and the struggle for our 2nd Amendment rights, but I believe they are joined in a profound way. In my view, any government that can ignore, obfuscate, and circumvent a clear Constitutional requirement is capable of any offense against its people.
The article below is by attorney Mario Apuzzo, lead counsel in the Kerchner v Obama case, which outlines in detail the failure of the Executive and Legislative branches to fulfill their duties to the Constitution and the people. As in this case and others which cite the 2nd Amendment Heller decision as precedent, my point as a “Birther” is simple:
Any government that claims “sovereign immunity” to shield itself from a redress of grievance of the people in a court of law seeks to be a law unto itself. If the requirements of Article 2 Section 1 are ignored today by the entire federal government, a national law to take your guns would likely be deemed “in the general public interest”, and thus you would also have no grounds or “Standing” to oppose it.
Mario Apuzzo presents how the judge ignored the application of law, the precisely presented arguments, distorted the Platintiff's claim of harm, and fully explains how he will proceed with the appeal to the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals.
The 'Real' Kerchner v. Obama & Congress Case Is On Its Way to the Higher Courts of Justice
He is called the straw man. Set him up and knock him down. Recently, the Hon. Jerome B. Simandle decided Kerchner et al. v. Obama and Congress et al. case, granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case. But did Judge Simandle decide the real Kerchner case? Let us take a deeper look to find out what the Kerchner case is really all about and what the Court did to avoid having to reach the merits of the question of whether Obama is an Article II “natural born Citizen” and eligible for the Office of President and Commander in Chief.
In the Kerchner complaint/petition, we allege that Obama has not conclusively proven that he was born in Hawaii. More importantly, we also allege that he is not an Article II "natural born Citizen" because when Obama was born his father was a British subject/citizen and Obama himself was the same, citing E. Vattel’s, The Law of Nations and Natural Law (1758) and John Jay’s letter of 1787 to then-General George Washington regarding providing a strong check on keeping foreign influence out of the Office of Commander in Chief by requiring that only a “natural born Citizen” occupy that critical and powerful office. As a naturalized citizen cannot be President because of being born subject to a foreign power, neither can Obama. It is important to understand that the Court did not rule in the Kerchner case that Obama has conclusively proven that he was born in Hawaii. It is also important to understand that the Court did not rule that Obama is an Article II “natural born Citizen.” Rather, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ case because of jurisdiction (Article III standing and prudential standing) and the political question doctrine without commenting on the underlying merits of whether Obama is constitutionally qualified to be President and Commander in Chief of the Military. The Court also did not rule that the plaintiffs’ claims are frivolous. By the Court finding that plaintiffs do not have standing and that their claims present a political question, the Court was able to avoid having to address the underlying merits of the Kerchner case. With such a decision, the American People unfortunately still do not know where Obama was born and whether he is an Article II “natural born Citizen” and therefore constitutionally eligible to be President and Commander in Chief.
On the question of Obama’s place of birth, Obama and Congress did not argue that plaintiffs fail to state a valid claim upon which the Court can give them any relief because Obama was in fact born in Hawaii. They could have simply produced for the Court simple evidence showing that Obama was born in Hawaii. The most important piece of simple evidence would have been Obama’s original, long-form birth certificate from Hawaii. They could have mounted their offensive by using the two Hawaiian newspaper birth announcements, affidavits from any persons with personal and relevant knowledge of Obama’s birth events, and medical records from Kapi’olani Medical Center, where Obama says he was born. They then could have argued that in light of such insurmountable evidence, plaintiffs’ birth-place claim lacks any merit. With such evidence in the record, they then could have asked the Court to dismissed plaintiffs’ birth-place claim with prejudice. If the Court would have granted their motion, that would have probably been the end of the birth-place issue not only in this Court but in all Courts throughout the country. But why did Obama and Congress not do such a simple thing like produce for the Court his original, long-form birth certificate and other readily available evidence and ask the Court that it dismiss the birth-place claim with prejudice once and for all? Any reasonable person must ask himself or herself what is Obama and his enablers in codependency with him ( http://www.asktheinternettherapist.com/counselingarchive-enabler-and-codependency.asp) hiding about his birth from the American people?
On the plaintiffs’ argument that Obama is not and cannot be an Article II “natural born Citizen” even if he was born in Hawaii, in our brief we cited for the Court the following cases and authorities in support of our definition of what a “natural born Citizen” is: E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, bk 1, c. 19, sec. 212 (1758) (1759 first English translation); The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 289 (1814) (Marshall, C.J., concurring) (cites Vattel’s definition of natural born citizens); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242, 245 (1830) (same definition without citing Vattel); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167-68 (1875) (same definition without citing Vattel); Ex parte Reynolds, 1879, 5 Dill., 394, 402 (same definition and cites Vattel); United States v. Ward, 42 F.320 (C.C.S.D.Cal. 1890) (same definition and cites Vattel); U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (only declared under the Fourteenth Amendment a child born on U.S. soil to foreign parents and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States a “citizen of the United States” and not an Article II “natural born Citizen” and Fuller, C.J, dissenting confirming Vattel’s definition of a “natural born Citizen” ); Keith v. U.S., 8 Okla. 446; 58 P. 507 (Okla. 1899) (common law rule that the offspring of free persons followed the condition of the father was applied to determine the citizenship status of a child); Rep. John Bingham (in the House on March 9, 1866, in commenting on the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which was the precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment: "[I] find no fault with the introductory clause, which is simply declaratory of what is written in the Constitution, that every human being born within the jurisdiction of the United States of parents not owing allegiance to any foreign sovereignty is, in the language of your Constitution itself, a natural born citizen. . . . ” Cong. Globe, 39th, 1st Session, 1291 (1866)); Sen Jacob Howard (the framer who co-wrote the Fourteenth Amendment citizenship clause stating in 1866 that the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment excluded persons born in the United States who were foreigners, aliens, or who belonged to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers. Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, May 30, 1866, p.2895, 2nd col.)) We requested that the Court enforce the United States Constitution, the supreme law of the land, and, given that Obama was not born in the country to a mother and father who were themselves United States citizens at his birth, not allow Obama to amend the Constitution by usurpation. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796.
Despite having raised and argued the “natural born Citizen” issue as such in our complaint/petition and brief (born in the country to citizen parents), the Court's decision fails to even acknowledge that this argument is part of plaintiffs’ case. On the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all factual allegations made by plaintiffs in their complaint/petition and interpret that complaint in a light most favorable to them. While devoting almost 4 pages of its 11-page opinion to a recitation of background facts, there is not one word in the Court’s opinion about plaintiffs alleging that Obama has admitted that under the British Nationality Act of 1948 at Obama’s birth his father was a British subject/citizen and therefore not a United States citizen and that Obama himself was born a British subject/citizen. We even requested in our opposition brief to the defendants’ motion to dismiss that the Court take judicial notice of Obama’s admission. Such a failure by the Court to acknowledge these facts and this argument in its opinion prevents the public from having an official record of such immensely important facts and only gives fuel to those who vilify the “birthers” for filing what they call frivolous law suits that they say present nothing but conspiratorial theories that deserve at least a $20,000.00 court sanction upon dismissal. Recognition of these facts is critical to our national security, for just like a naturalized citizen cannot be President because he/she is born subject to a foreign power, Obama who was born subject to a foreign power also cannot be President and leader of our military men and woman. The question then is why did the Court not even make any mention in its opinion of these uncontested facts which clearly show that Obama was born subject to a foreign power and which are the basis of the most important part of the Kerchner action?
Not only did the Court not reveal for the public’s benefit in its decision the factual basis for plaintiffs’ argument that Obama is not and cannot be an Article II “natural born Citizen,” but it ridiculed plaintiffs’ case by stating that “[t]he harm alleged for all of these constitutional violations is that Plaintiffs have been deprived of their right to know whether President Obama is a ‘natural born citizen’ and to have a president who is truly a ‘natural born citizen.’” The Court again repeated: “Plaintiffs allege that they have been injured because defendants have not adequately established that the President is truly a ‘natural born citizen…’” Note the Court said “all” of these constitutional violations. This is to mean that even with all these constitutional claims, in total they really do not amount to anything. Of course, no reasonable person would care about whether the plaintiffs are personally satisfied (their right to know which is nothing more than a subjective feeling) that the President is a “natural born Citizen.” But plaintiffs’ action has nothing to do with their personal satisfaction about whether Obama is a “natural born Citizen” and everything to do with whether Obama meets the requirements of Article II that a presidential contender must be a “natural born Citizen” to be eligible for that position. It is clear from the complaint/petition and our brief that the plaintiffs argued that Article II of the Constitution provides in pertinent part that no person may be President unless he/she is a “natural born Citizen” and that the objective definition of that clause may be found in legal authorities of the Founding era and in the subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. We also argued it is this objective Constitution standard that must be respected and satisfied regarding presidential eligibility requirements. We never presented any case suggesting that plaintiffs have some subjective need to satisfy themselves that the president is “truly” a “natural born citizen.”
Furthermore, the Court stated that the plaintiffs want to know that the President is “truly” a “natural born citizen.” By characterizing plaintiffs’ claim as such, the Court has not only subtly expressed an indefensible hostility to the merits of plaintiffs’ “natural born Citizen” argument but further denigrated plaintiffs’ argument on the constitutional need that Obama must be a “natural born Citizen” in order to be President. No where did the plaintiffs ever distinguish as the court accuses them of between a “natural born Citizen” and a “truly” “natural born Citizen.” To ascribe to plaintiffs the desire to want to know that Obama is a “truly” “natural born Citizen” is to mock their argument. The Constitution textually requires that a would-be president be a “natural born Citizen.” This is all plaintiffs ever argued. For the Court to state that the plaintiffs want a “truly” “natural born Citizen” is to mislead the public into believing that the plaintiffs have their own laughable, cooky subjective standard (of course not the constitutional one) of what a “natural born Citizen” is, and that they maintain that Obama is not good enough to meet that standard. By emphasizing the word “truly” not once by twice, the Court has tacitly ascribed at best a nutty and at worst a discriminatory purpose to plaintiffs’ cause of action. If it is the latter, given that Obama is the first African-American President (although putative), such statements could cause civil unrest. The misleading nature of the Court’s characterization of plaintiffs’ “natural born Citizen” argument is compounded by the fact that as seen above the Court did not even reveal in its decision what plaintiffs’ argument is regarding Article II’s “natural born Citizen” requirement (again, born in the country to citizen parents which is neither wacky nor discriminatory).
Regarding standing, upon reading the Court’s decision one comes away with the belief that plaintiffs’ claim for standing rested upon lead plaintiff Charles Kerchner, Jr. being a retired U.S. Navy reservist subject to recall to active duty and as such that he would then need to know if his orders were emanating from a legitimate commander in chief. This conclusion is erroneous. In fact, the recall to active duty argument was the last of several arguments that we made in the complaint and brief to prove standing. On the contrary, in our complaint and brief to prove that my clients have standing we also alleged and argued that my clients have suffered an infringement of individual constitutional rights by Obama’s violating their substantive 5th Amendment unalienable rights to liberty, safety, security, and tranquility by occupying the Office of President when he is not constitutionally eligible for that all powerful office and by Congress violating their 5th Amendment rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection, and 1st Amendment rights to redress of grievances, by allowing Obama to occupy the Office of President when he is constitutionally ineligibility to hold that position. We submitted to the Court that these specific facts which give rise to violations of the cited constitutional provisions set our plaintiffs apart from other Americans. But despite our presenting such arguments to support standing based on the 1st, 5th , and 9th Amendments and the Court stating that it was compelled by law on defendants’ motion to dismiss to accept as true plaintiffs’ factual allegations contained in the complaint, the Court ignored and did not address our arguments. Other than saying by way of footnote that Congress is not constitutionally obligated to respond to plaintiffs’ petition (which they filed for the sake of their liberty, safety, security, and tranquility) that their President and Commander in Chief of the Military is constitutionally eligible for that office, no where in the Court’s opinion will one find any discussion of these crucial points which plaintiffs made to show that they have standing.
For some unknown reason, Judge Simandle decided to pick the military recall argument as his focus and did not address the main and much stronger standing arguments we made. We have already seen other Courts ridicule the attempt to gain standing through the military recall argument. Needless to say, this decision invites those who may have the pleasure to do so to also ridicule the Kerchner case for making such an argument. In fact, it has already happened that those who have been waiting to denigrate the Kerchner case have focused on this part of Judge Simandle’s decision on standing to show that the case deserved to be dismissed without hesitation because it was just another “birther” law suit presenting nothing but speculation about the possible consequences of some future military duties. One can only wonder why the Court focused only on the weakest of plaintiffs’ standing arguments to support its dismissal for lack of standing. Hence, the Court's decision does not acknowledge for some unknown reason the critical issue about Obama's constitutional eligibility (born in the country to parents who are citizens) nor does is address the main and most powerful arguments made in the brief regarding my clients’ standing to bring their action.
Let us now examine what else the Court said about standing. The Court did not say that plaintiffs’ injuries are not concrete. The President and Commander in Chief wields enormous power over the plaintiffs’ lives. As the Chief Executive and Commander of all the military force, he has the constitutional obligation to protect them from enemies both foreign and domestic. Hence, given that the President regularly makes life and death decisions, it cannot be denied that plaintiffs are personally and directly affected in a concrete way by everything the President does and does not do. Concerning Obama, we are not attacking the wisdom or soundness of government action or asking the Court to assume any authority over some other co-equal branch of government. Plaintiffs’ action against him is not an action against the government. We are not suing him because plaintiffs do not like him, because of a generalized feeling of discomfort about his occupying the Office of President, or because plaintiffs have suffered psychological harm. Rather, we are questioning whether he meets the textual “natural born Citizen” eligibility requirements of Article II, a requirement that he must meet prior to executive power legitimately vesting in him. He must meet this objective constitutional requirement regardless of what the plaintiffs may personally believe or how the plaintiffs may feel about him. As it applies to Congress, we are alleging that it failed to protect plaintiffs by making sure that Obama meets that textual eligibility requirement which not only provides them with individual protection but also serves a national security purpose. We can see that the Court did not say that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that they have suffered an injury. The Court did not say that plaintiffs only alleged that they have some general interest in how government should behave. The Court did not say that the plaintiffs have not been and do not continue to be sufficiently injured by the actions of Obama and Congress.
The Court did, however, say that plaintiffs’ injuries are not particularized as to them. The Court stated: “[W]hile Plaintiffs feel themselves very seriously injured, that alleged grievance is one they share with all United States citizens. . . .” The Court went on to state: “In the present case, assuming as the Court must that Plaintiffs’ allegations are true for the purposes of deciding this jurisdiction motion, the injury, if any, suffered by Plaintiffs is one that would be shared by all the American people,” that “the alleged harms apply equally to all United States residents,” that the “harm is equally applicable to all American citizens….” The Court said that because the type of injury that plaintiffs allegedly suffered is also suffered by “all United States citizens,” “all the American people,” “all United States residents,” the plaintiffs do not have standing. In other words, the Court said that if one is injured and suffers alone, one has standing. But if one is injured and suffers along with “all” the rest of the American “citizens,” “people,” or “residents,” one does not have standing.
The Court’s reasoning leaves one thinking how the Court knows that so many other Americans have also suffered an injury like the plaintiffs have. “All” these other American citizens were surely not before the Court to be examined about whether they even care about Obama’s eligibility for the Office of President let alone to determine if they suffered deprivation of their 1st, 5th, and 9th Amendment rights as the plaintiffs alleged they have. Have these other millions of Americans asserted to Congress their 1st Amendment right for a redress of grievances? Have they suffered a deprivation of their 5th Amendment rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection? What evidence do we have that they have suffered these injuries as plaintiffs have? On the contrary, there are millions of Americans who welcome Obama to continue to be sitting as President regardless of whether he is eligible for the office? We can not possibly contend that these other millions of Americans have been injured by Obama’s lack of eligibility and Congress’s allowance of Obama to occupy the Office of President when he is not constitutionally qualified to do so.
More importantly, where is the soundness or logic of a judicial concept as expressed by the Court which provides that if you suffer an injury alone, the court can help you, but if you suffer that same injury with “all other American citizens,” “people,” or “residents,” the court cannot. Is it controlling on the question of standing and whether a specific party has a right to judicial relief that other persons have also been injured by the defendant’s conduct? If someone suffers an injury, does that injury lose its concrete character or become not particularized because others may also suffer the same injury? Does a cut on one’s arm caused by a defendant become not concrete and not particularized because the defendant has also caused the same cut on the arm of a million other people? If someone is a victim in a mass fraud or mass tort situation, does that person lose his right to bring a legal action because a million other people also share the same harm? Does not the law allow an individual injured by an unsafe product to sue the manufacturer in products liability and recognize that he/she has standing even though whether the product is safe affects in a substantial way millions of other consumers and users who may benefit from the results of the law suit? Contrary to the Court’s ruling, a party who adequately shows his own injury is entitled to establish standing “even though the court’s judgment may benefit others collaterally” or “even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 501 (1975). As long as plaintiffs adequately show their own injury, it is also perfectly acceptable for them to “invoke the general public interest in support of their claim.” Id. at 501. A careful reading of the Kerchner complaint/petition shows that plaintiffs are asserting violations of their own constitutional rights and not just the rights of third persons.
One can only wonder how a standing concept as expressed by the Kerchner Court can be consistently and honestly applied by the courts to the myriad of public interest law suits that are brought before it. I submit that such a notion is not a correct statement of the law of standing, for how can such a position be correct if the plaintiffs are themselves injured but due to no fault of their own they also happen to be among the injured? On the contrary, plaintiffs should have standing even if they are also among the injured. The United States Supreme Court in Warth makes this perfectly clear. Given the Court’s finding that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an injury, how can it be reasonably argued that my clients have not been and are not continuing to be directly affected by Obama’s ineligibility and Congress’s inaction? Our appeal will ask the appellate court to agree with us on these points.
The Court said that it cannot exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims because they present a “political question.” The Court used this finding to support both its conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to satisfy prudential standing concerns and to separately show that the plaintiffs’ case does not present the court with a political question. A claim that presents a “political question” is not justiciable in federal court because of separation of powers provided for in the Constitution. As we can see, what is the definition of an Article II “natural born citizen” as intended by the Framers and whether Congress carried out its textually prescribed constitutional obligations under the 20th Amendment to make sure that Obama met that definition and was therefore qualified to occupy the Office of President are not “political questions” but rather legal constitutional questions requiring the Court to interpret the text of the Constitution with the aid of the many existing historical sources and applying that interpretation to uncontested facts. It is this textually demonstrable constitutional provision itself which the Court can use to determine Obama’s duty, whether he breached that duty, and the appropriate remedy for that breach which can be declaratory, mandamus or injunctive relief. Article II, Section 1, clause 5 also requires that a person must be 35 years old to qualify to be President. Would we say that whether a presidential contender is 35 years old is a political question that a court of law could not decide? Of course not. It is abundantly clear that the judicial branch of government can decide the eligibility issue by utilizing the text of Article II itself along with the many other legal and historical sources to help it interpret that clause without interfering with any of the other branches of government. Additionally, the Constitution does not give to either Congress or the Executive the authority to interpret the “natural born Citizen” clause of the Constitution. It is true that Congress has the constitutional power under the 20th Amendment to determine if Obama met Article II’s eligibility requirements, but the scope of that constitutional commitment does not include Congress having the power to define those eligibility requirements. If Congress were to confirm someone for President who is not qualified under Article II, clearly Congress would impermissibly exceed the authority given to it under the 20th Amendment to confirm someone who satisfies the Presidential eligibility requirements. So if the Constitution does not give a power to Congress but rather gives it to the Court, there is no separation of powers problem when the Court exercises that power. Also, we cannot expect Congress and the Executive to police and sanction themselves for violating the Constitution and to come clean on the Obama constitutional eligibility question. Hence, if those branches of government cannot and should not be expected to rectify our constitutional crisis who but the judicial branch can? Moreover, the Court’s interpretation and application of the “natural born Citizen” clause would not involve the Court interfering with the Executive Branch. Obama was constitutionally compelled to prove that he was qualified for the Office of President when he was still a private person. Hence, to challenge him on his constitutional eligibility is to challenge him as a private person and not as the President in whom executive power has vested under Article II, Section 1, clause 1.
Finally the Court has reduced plaintiffs’ injuries to nothing more than their “belie[fs],” “right to know,” “feel[ings],” “motivations,” “satisfaction[s],” “frustration,” and “perce[ptions]” about Obama’s eligibility to be President and the Congress’s actions. Furthermore, in suggesting to plaintiffs a remedy, the Court expects plaintiffs to assuage their frustration by going to the polls and voting. Apart from the fact that we are concerned with a constitutional objective standard applicable to the question of whether Obama is constitutionally eligible to be President, we cannot realistically expect that plaintiffs can find any redress for their grievances and claims by casting their few votes at the polls. We cannot honestly expect the plaintiffs to mount their constitutional attack by bringing their eligibility argument to the streets and convincing enough voters about it to be able to garner sufficient support to win the next election. Do we even know if Obama is running for President again? Is it realistic to expect that the plaintiffs could vindicate their constitutional rights all in the next election? Should the plaintiffs have to wait without any remedy other than the political process to run its course through the various future elections? As is self evident, not only is it not realistic to expect plaintiffs to heal their constitutional injuries through the election process, but to expect them to go to the polls to find constitutional solace and relief would be tantamount to abandoning our Constitutional Republic and abdicating the rule of law to democratic mob rule.
The judiciary is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Hence, we cannot reasonable deny that under our system of government it is only the judicial branch of government that can provide plaintiffs with any real and legitimate relief on these textually existing constitutional issues. As Chief Justice John Marshall explained in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the Courts are well suited for undertaking such a constitutional task given its constitutional obligation to provide judicial review of the actions of the other branches of government when its jurisdiction is established. Indeed, the judicial branch of government must diligently and courageously do its part if the checks and balances that are so important to preventing tyranny and abuse of power are to work. Hence, the Court is not prevented from deciding the Obama eligibility issue because of any political question problem. On the contrary, the court is constitutionally duty bound to take jurisdiction over the Kerchner case.
It is important to bring these failings of the Court’s decision to the public’s attention because this vital information is not in the decision and is therefore buried from public view. When other cases comment and the media reports on the Kerchner case, they will most likely only look to see what the court said in the opinion and not also what the plaintiffs presented to the Court. By looking only to the Court’s decision itself, other courts and the media will fail to report to the public the most important arguments made in the case regarding Obama’s constitutional ineligibility and the plaintiffs’ standing to bring their action. Inaccuracy only becomes worse when there is a hidden bias in favor of Obama or an antipathy for those bringing the Obama eligibility law suits.
A court cannot refuse to hear a case on the merits merely because it prefers not to due to grave social or political ramifications. As we have seen, the Court’s opinion dismissing the Kerchner complaint/petition did not address the real Kerchner case but rather looked for a way to dismiss the case without having to reach the merits of the question of whether Obama is an Article II “natural born Citizen.” It is my hope that the public will take the time to read the Kerchner complaint/petition (table of contents for the complaint) and the legal briefs that I filed supporting it and opposing the defendants’ motion to dismiss so that it can learn first hand what the Obama eligibility case is really about and draw an intelligent and informed decision on whether Obama is constitutionally qualified to be President and Commander in Chief of the Military. We are now working on filing our appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Philadelphia which court we hope will decide our case dispassionately.
Mario Apuzzo, Esq. 185 Gatzmer Avenue Jamesburg, New Jersey08831 http://puzo1.blogspot.com/ October 24, 2009
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